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Abstract
            It is argued that human capital theory applies only weakly to artists’ decisions about
investment in schooling and training and about occupational choice. However, the same can be
said about the sorting model. What is lacking in cultural economics is an understanding of talent
and creativity, what economic factors motivate artists and how creativity can be encouraged as
part of government cultural policy. Bringing social and cultural capital into the equation do not
seem to add much in the way of understanding artists’ labour markets. A novel argument is made
that the reproducibility of works of art in combination with copyright law alters the established
view that human capital cannot be separated from labour, in this case that of the artist.
Keywords
human capital, labour markets, artists’ training
JEL Classifications: Z1, J24, I21, K11,H4
Lady Bracknell. (to her daughter’s suitor) …....Do you smoke?
Jack. Well, yes, I must admit I smoke.
Lady Bracknell. I am glad to hear it. A man should always have an occupation of some kind. There are far too
many idle men in London as it is.  How old are you?
Jack. Twenty-nine.
Lady Bracknell. A very good age to be married at.  I have always been of the opinion that a man who desires to
get married should know either everything or nothing.  Which do you know?
Jack.  I know nothing, Lady Bracknell.
Lady Bracknell. I am pleased to hear it.  I do not approve of anything that tampers with natural ignorance.
Ignorance is like a delicate exotic fruit; touch it and the bloom is gone.  The whole theory of modern education
is radically unsound.  Fortunately in England, at any rate, education produces no effect whatsoever.  If it did, it
would prove a serious danger to the upper classes, and probably lead to acts of violence in Grosvenor Square.
What is your income?
Jack. Between seven and eight thousand a year.
Oscar Wilde The Importance of Being Earnest (Act I). First published in 1899.
1.         Introduction
            The role of human capital in labour economics has a long history, going back to Adam
Smith. Smith recognised the effect of both training and talent in determining wages, the latter in
his famous comment on the ‘exorbitant’ rewards of opera singers and dancers.[1] The influence of
innate ability and knowledge acquisition on earnings has been much discussed in human capital
theory and this discussion is particularly relevant to artists. The study of artists’ labour markets is
important in cultural economics because we need to understand what factors affect the supply of
work by creative artists and performers since cultural policy, whatever its explicit aims, is
ultimately designed to encourage creativity.
            In this chapter, two basic questions are addressed: what contribution does human capital
theory make to understanding creativity in the arts and culture and what contribution does cultural
economics make to our understanding of human capital? Much of the analysis of human capital
over the last 30 years has been about the econometric problems of identifying the specific
contribution to earnings of innate ability rather than of ability acquired through ‘schooling’.
Because the role of innate ability or talent is far greater in the arts than it is in non-arts
occupations, its influence is an area in which cultural economics can make a contribution to
human capital theory.  It also seems likely that on-the-job training and experience are more
important in the arts than in other occupations.  Another distinguishing feature of artists’ supply
behaviour is their concern with utility and reputation, which considerably modifies their desire for
financial reward.  Furthermore, the arts and cultural industries are areas in which there is
dependence on copyright law for protecting artists’ earnings, enabling them to obtain future as
well as present income. There is, therefore, reason to believe that artists’ labour markets differ
from those of other workers and this raises the question whether human capital theory applies in
them. However, while there has been a great deal of empirical work on the role of human capital
in ‘ordinary’ labour markets, there have been relatively few econometric studies of artists’ labour
markets.
            This chapter is organised as follows: an introduction to human capital theory precedes a
brief summary of issues in the measurement of human capital using earnings functions, including
those relating to artists. Then the role of talent and creativity in artists’ labour markets is
discussed, with particular reference to the superstar phenomenon. That is followed by a section on
artists’ training and occupational choice, after which we consider the analogy between human
capital, social capital and cultural capital.  We then turn to the relation in artists’ labour markets
between human capital, the ability to reproduce artists’ work and copyright law, showing how that
alters the ‘inalienability’ problem in human capital.
2.         The theory of human capital
2.1.      The basic theory
            Sherwin Rosen has defined human capital as “...the stock of skills and productive
knowledge embodied in people.  The yield or return on human capital investment lies in
enhancing a person’s skills and earning power, and in increasing the efficiency of economic
decision-making both within and without the market economy” (Rosen 1987, p. 682).  This
definition captures two essential features of the theory: that human capital cannot be separated
from the person, and that human capital embodied in an individual may be increased by
investment.  What it does not recognise, however, is the ambiguity of the concept of human
capital as a combination of inherited characteristics, tacit knowledge, innate ability and acquired
skills; each plays some role in the individual’s productivity and earning power but how much
influence is exerted by one or the other has proved difficult to pin down.
            A thumbnail sketch of the theory is as follows: though the concept of human capital had
been recognised by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, it was only in the 1960s that Theodore
Schultz (1961) set the stage for the present day interest in human capital theory. The fundamental
conceptual framework of analysis for virtually all subsequent work in this area was developed by
Gary Becker in his path-breaking book Human Capital (1964).  In it, he introduced the distinction
between specific and general labour training, arguing that schooling (formal education) was in
fact a leading example of human capital formation by general training.  Jacob Mincer (1958) then
specified the now standard human capital earnings function that has given rise to a huge literature
on the measurement of lifetime income and wealth (Willis, 1986).
            Adam Smith had understood the essence of the notion of human capital investment: the
formation of human capital through costly education, the necessity for higher earnings to
compensate those who had made the investment in human capital, and the accrual of these
earnings over a lifetime.
            A man educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments
which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to [an expensive
machine].  The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the
usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expence of his education,
with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It must do this too in a
reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same
manner as to the more certain duration of the machine.
            The difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common   labour, is
founded upon this principle (Smith 1976, pp. 118-9).
            Marshall also pursued the analogy between physical and human capital and between the
wage rate and the rental rate of capital. He emphasised the difference between physical and
human capital on the grounds that there is no market in human capital but rather a market in the
hire of labour embodying the investment.  This is what Rosen (1987, p. 682) refers to as
“differences in the nature of property rights between them”.  Furthermore, Marshall made the case
for subsidies to education based on the implications of social inequality of access to the capital
market for the finance of education (Blaug 1970, p. 3-6).
            Blaug (1970) raised the question whether the concept of human capital is perhaps no more
than a metaphor, and moreover whether all education indeed has an investment motive or whether
it is not to some extent a consumption good.  Education and learning may yield utility directly to
the individual rather than a deferred utility of potential higher earnings.  Furthermore,
occupational choice may not be determined solely by financial reward because people may choose
an occupation for non-pecuniary motives such as a preferred lifestyle.  Occupations that require a
higher level of human capital investment and so pay more are also ones, contrary to Adam Smith,
that may be more attractive on non-monetary grounds. The identification of consumption
elements, utility and the pursuit of non-monetary rewards might therefore be difficult to
disentangle.  These observations are particularly relevant to artists’ training and occupational
choices. We return to a discussion of the usefulness of the capital metaphor in Section 6 below.
            For Becker, however, the analogy between physical and human capital is central.
According to Becker, individuals invest in human capital formation up to the point at which the
discounted costs of formal education and on-the-job training equal the discounted future earnings
over the individual’s lifetime.  The rate of return that equates these two streams must in
equilibrium equal the rate of interest, that is, the cost of borrowing the outlay on the investment.
The private rate of return, which accrues to the individual, is calculated from the out-of-pocket
(direct) costs of schooling and the indirect costs of earnings forgone during the investment period.
The social rate of return takes into account the return to society via income taxes and the total cost
of providing schooling. Empirical estimates of the two rates of return produce the result that the
private rate typically exceeds the social rate, if only because the social cost of schooling exceeds
its private cost.
            Like Marshall, Becker recognised that all families do not have equal access to financial
resources and that affects the human capital investment decision. Family background may exert
other influences on the costs and returns to human capital investment; inherited characteristics and
early advantages such as health, greater investment during childhood, above average ability and
innate talent all mean that some individuals learn more easily than others and therefore achieve
higher productivity from a given period of study or, pari passu, need to spend less to achieve the
same learning outcome.  These family background and interpersonal differences give rise to the so-
called ‘ability bias’ in measuring the rate of return to investment in human capital.  We shall see
later that this is an important topic in artists’ labour markets.
            Becker also considered the question of who pays for post-compulsory education and
training, the individual or the employer.  The employer has no incentive to pay for general
training that can be transferred between firms but does have the incentive to pay for firm-specific
training.[2] Firms may well offer general training to employees but then ‘charge’ them for it by
paying them lower wages (as in an apprenticeship training).
2.2.      Sorting models
            Human capital theory in its Chicago School version (Schultz, Becker, Mincer and Rosen)
is not accepted by everyone in the economics of education or labour economics.  The most
fundamental criticism comes from those who support an alternative explanation of the observed
positive relationship between investment in schooling and higher earnings – the screening
hypothesis. Screening, which is always linked to signalling (the education system screens and
students signal), is a form of sorting; indeed Weiss (1995) recommends using the generic term
’sorting’ to include both aspects. According to sorting models, employers use educational choice
to draw inferences about unobserved attributes that are correlated with schooling. Employers use
formal qualifications (a university degree, for example) as an information signal about worker
quality, but information is asymmetric – workers know their own productivity but employers
cannot tell which workers are the most productive. Workers signal their superior productivity to
employers by acquiring paper qualifications which high ability students acquire more easily.  This
‘self-selection bias’ is exacerbated by the finding that many highly educated students come from
higher socio-economic family backgrounds.  The extreme version of the sorting model combines
screening and signalling to conclude that higher earnings do not reflect higher marginal
productivity at all, but only society’s institutional commitment to ‘credentialism’. Ability bias and
signalling are difficult to separate and in general it has proved impossible to identify them
empirically, at least so as to persuade the sceptic. All agree that more time spent in schooling
yields higher earnings but sorting models dispute precisely what it is that leads to greater
productivity.
            Becker has argued that a refutation of sorting models lies in the fact that the education
system is an inordinately expensive screening device; such inefficiency is unlikely to develop
spontaneously in a competitive economy and is even more unlikely to be sustainable over long
periods of time. This argument carries greater force in the USA where students pay for further and
higher education, but in many European countries both are either free or available at very low
fees. So the direct cost of post-compulsory education in Europe is small, leaving only the cost of
forgone earnings to be borne by students and their parents. Indeed, many European countries even
offer students grants and rewards for completing a course.  In the arts, we see courses being over-
subscribed as hopeful students who do not have to pay the full cost of training crowd into art,
music and acting colleges (Towse, 1996). We also observe that employers in the arts place little
reliance on certification based on formal schooling and often use their own screening devices, a
refutation of Becker (Towse, 1993); we return below to these and other differences between
artists’ and other labour markets.
            Before leaving the general theory of human capital, it is worthwhile anticipating a later
discussion of the way copyright law (in combination with ‘reproducibility’ by means of copying
technologies) alters property rights in human capital in the cultural sector. Many writers (for
example, Blaug, 1970) have dwelt on the absence of a market for human capital separated from
the labour of the individual and have claimed that only a slave economy would permit direct
purchase of human capital analogous to the purchase of physical capital.  However, human capital
embodied in works protected by intellectual property rights can be ‘alienated’ by the assignment
or transfer of the right to use them.  For example, take the case of a sound recording: copyright
law provides a number of rights for composers and performers, who use their skill and labour to
create works that are recorded in a CD; but once these rights have been transferred to the record
company, they become its assets, which it can exploit or sell as it sees fit. Copyright is therefore
intimately tied up with the appropriation of artists’ human capital.  Nor is this only a feature of
artists’ labour markets; the growth of the ‘Information Society’ or the ‘Knowledge Economy’ and
the spread of intellectual property law into ever more sectors of the economy have created similar
conditions in other labour markets.
3.         Earnings functions
3.1.      Estimation
            Earnings data are the single most important source of information about human capital as
they represent both the returns to investment and the cost of the time taken to make the
investment.  Lifetime earnings are typically represented in age-earnings profiles. Earning starts
when compulsory education ceases – if the legal school leaving age is, say, 16 years of age, any
schooling beyond 16 incurs the opportunity cost of the earnings of 16+ year olds.  Thus the age
earning profile begins at age 16 and continues to retirement age.  Normal age earnings profiles
display a common pattern: from the age of entry into the labour force they rise, then flatten out at
around mid-career and fall towards retirement age.
            Investment in human capital does not cease with the start of work, however, since on-the-
job training now begins.  On-the-job training is a loose concept that includes experience or
learning-by-doing, which increases with age.  Mincer (1958) recognised that workers could also
choose at each point to invest in formal on-the-job- training as a substitute for years of schooling
and that that would eventually be compensated by higher earnings.  Workers may rationally
choose different jobs that enable them to gain experience, accepting lower earnings while they are
trained on the job.  Mincer analysed these different choices by individuals as yielding a series of
age-earnings profiles whose shape is determined by the different combination of direct and
indirect costs of education and on-the-job training. Because they represent different combinations
of earnings forgone and lifetime earnings, the age earnings profiles must cross. Mincer called this
the ‘over-taking point’, which he argued would depend on the reciprocal of the internal rate of
return, the discount rate that equates the stream of lifetime earnings with the cost of the
investment.  This approach enables the researcher to take into account the effect of family
background effects such as financial constraints, but it does not solve the problems of ability bias
or self-selection bias.
            The Mincer earnings function has become the standard model for statistical measurement
of the supply of educated labour and for estimating the internal rate of return to education:
            log Y = log Y0 + rS + b1X + b2X2 + u                                                             (1)           
where Y is income, S is length of schooling, X is length of time in the workforce as a proxy for
years of work experience and u is the error term; the constant term is the log of the equivalent
annuitized income of initial human capital value (innate and family background effects), r is the
rate of return to schooling, b1 and b2 capture the effects of experience (Rosen 1992, p. 162).
Several econometric specifications of the earnings function have been tried out and innumerable
empirical studies have been made; a survey of the early literature is to be found in Willis (1986).
            The ideal data for measuring the effect of investment in human capital would consist of
longitudinal information on individuals’ lifetime earnings combined with individual tuition
expenses. Such data are rarely available and in practice aggregate cross section or panel data are
used; however, they abstract from individual decision-making and give rise to bias in estimation.
Simplifying assumptions are therefore needed to enable researchers to use the data available.
Briefly these are: that the only cost of education is earnings forgone; that individuals enter the
labour force immediately on completing their studies; and that the individual’s working life is
independent of her years of education.
            The problem of estimating the ability bias is aggravated by the use of aggregate cross-
section data; individual data would avoid much of this problem by providing information on
family background and possibly even on early IQ and other measures of innate ability.  In the
attempt to separate out the influence of innate ability and human capital investment on earnings
differentials, studies of identical and non-identical twins have been used.  Rosen (1987) reports
that such studies have found that around one-third of the difference in earnings was due to
differences in human capital investment, one-third was due to ‘person effects’ (unmeasured
ability, health and other such factors) and one-third was due to random events, luck and suchlike.
These findings are particularly relevant to artists, for whom variations in talent and luck may well
be higher than for other professionals.  This is discussed in more detail below.
3.2.      Artists’ earnings functions
            We now turn to empirical studies that have been done of earnings functions in arts
occupations.  These studies have tested the human capital model outlined above, treating artists as
workers like any others making rational choices about investment in education and on-the-job-
training and occupation. There are considerable difficulties concerning the definition of the artist
population and of obtaining data.[3]  Suffice it to say here that in most countries in which these
studies have been attempted, there are severe problems in obtaining artists’ earnings data. Census
data either cannot be disaggregated to appropriate artistic occupational levels or are subject to
severe bias due to multiple job-holding.  In the USA, Filer (1986) used Census data to estimate
earnings functions for a range of artistic occupations but the validity of his results have been
widely disputed by cultural economists because he used aggregate income data (Towse 2001a, Ch.
3). Consequently, cross-section survey data have been used in preference to Census data but
response rates may be low and sample sizes may be relatively small and possibly
unrepresentative. Interestingly, however, Filer found only a very weak effect of human capital
variables on artists’ earnings. In a later study in which he analysed earnings functions separately
for different arts occupations, still using Census data, he found that longer schooling even had a
negative effect in the case of performing artists (Filer, 1990). Wassall and Alper (1985) did one of
the first earnings-function studies of artists using data from their survey of 3,000 artists in New
England that allowed them to separate arts from non-arts income. They found that education was
not positively correlated with income from arts work though it was from non-arts work, a finding
that has been since replicated in other studies.
            Large-scale national surveys of artists’ earnings have been carried out in Australia and
enabled two authors Withers (1985) and Throsby (1992; 1994; 1996) to estimate earnings
functions.[4] Withers varied the standard Mincer specification by making a distinction between
formal education and other qualifications (trade and technical certificates), using the imputed
hourly wage rate and reported hours of work to measure earnings.  He noted that the standard
assumption of continuous employment from entry into the labour market to retirement age
overstates work experience for females, a higher proportion of whom are in the arts compared to
the non-arts workforce. This, however, would apply to all artists since many artists work
irregularly and have frequent periods of unemployment during job searches. Withers’ results
showed that, compared to all Australian workers, artists earned 40 percent less, which he
interpreted as the ‘subsidy of artists to the arts’. The 40 percent penalty can also be viewed as a
compensating differential, the ‘psychic income’ for the net advantages of a preferred occupation –
the interpretation depends on whether or not you assume that changing occupations is frictionless.
 On the latter point, Filer (1987) found that the penalty for the choice of artistic occupation in the
USA was not high and that ‘failed’ artists were able to move into other occupations without a high
earnings penalty – a striking testimony to the power of general training.  Withers also found that
human capital variables had only a very weak effect on earnings and concluded that innate
characteristics (talent and motivation) and luck, though not identified, must play a considerable
role in determining earnings in the arts.
            Using the same data set, Throsby (1994) estimated an important variation on the standard
form of the earnings function.  The Australian survey (which he had directed) collected data on
earnings and hours of work in arts and non-arts work.  This was done because it was known from
qualitative research that artists typically divide their work time between their chosen artistic
occupation (arts work) and jobs outside the arts (non-arts work), mainly because they are unable
to earn a living wage from the former.  This approach was a means of overcoming the bias
introduced in census data, which defines artists on the basis of their occupation in census week
and attributes earnings from all sources to their arts work, even if a substantial part is due to non-
arts work; this was a criticism that had been made of Filer’s 1986 study (which he had defended
as a ‘market test’ of who is and who is not an artist).  Throsby therefore was able to estimate
earnings functions for arts and non-arts work and he was able to separate out the private rate of
return to education, training and experience in both arts work and in non-arts work.  That had the
advantage that he was able to compare rates of return for the same sample, unlike Withers (and
others) who had made comparisons between aggregations of different sets of individuals.
Throsby found that human capital investment was an explanatory factor of income differentials in
both sectors, though the human capital model performed less well for arts work than for non-arts
work, again due to the unspecified effect of talent and other innate ability factors.  It should be
noted, however, that the studies by both Withers and Throsby had low R2 values, indicating that
much about earnings differentials was left unexplained.
            Subsequently, Throsby (1996) estimated another earnings function for Australian artists
using data from a later survey and testing two different specifications, one a linear model using
two-stage least squares and a second using the Mincerean earnings function (equation 1 above),
again breaking down earnings and hours worked, this time identifying arts, arts-related (such as
art teaching) and non-arts work.  His hypothesis was that income from arts and arts-related work
are influenced by the level of professional arts training, whereas non-arts income is more likely to
be influenced by the level of general education, and that time spent on-the-job as an artist is the
appropriate explanatory variable for arts and arts related work, with age (as a proxy for
experience) being more relevant to non-arts earnings.  Dummy variables for level of training,
education and gender were used.  The models were tested with a further division between creative
artists (writers, composers, choreographers and so on) and performers (actors, musicians, dancers
and the rest).  Interestingly, this elaboration of his earlier study did not yield very different results.
 The linear model performed better than the standard Mincer model and the hypotheses of the
standard model were confirmed.  Even so, R-squareds for arts income were low, indicating that
factors other than human capital were at work.  The experience of testing human capital models in
the arts has led Throsby to develop a work-preference model of artist behaviour (Throsby 1994) as
an alternative to the human capital investment model.  Cowen and Tabarrok (2000) also develop a
utility-based model.  It remains to be seen how these models stand up to empirical testing.
3.3.      Methodological aspects
            By way of conclusion to this section on estimating earnings functions, it is worth
considering the methodological aspects of human capital theory (methodology being the logic of
different methods, not merely a comparison of methods of econometric estimation).  Blaug (1976)
subjected the theory of human capital to methodological analysis based on Lakatos’ concept of a
scientific research programme and asked what empirical tests would refute it?  Is it ‘a theory’ or a
set of theories – in Lakatosian terms, is there a ‘hard core’ of theory or just a ‘protective belt’ of
ad hoc empirical generalisations?  Though sorting models appear to provide a rival theory, Blaug
believed they would eventually become a complement to the human capital hypothesis; moreover,
as noted earlier, no discriminating test has been found that could refute one hypothesis and
confirm the other, despite a huge battery of empirical work.[5] In the absence of a rival theory,
Blaug concluded that the human capital research programme had to be evaluated on its own terms:
the predictions of the theory cannot unambiguously be tested because of the unsolved question of
the separate influence of innate ability and the assumption of individual rational behaviour
regarding the schooling decision. The question therefore is not so much whether schooling
explains earnings, a fact commonly accepted, but why it does so.
            Despite these objections, Blaug  acknowledged that there has been empirical progress in
human capital theory in the sense of better data, more sophisticated modelling and econometric
analysis.  That could also be said of empirical testing of earnings functions in the arts, though
there are far, far fewer examples.  The absence of reliable data sets still inhibits research in artists’
labour markets but what studies there are point to fundamental difficulties.  Apart from the
obvious question of what is talent – to be discussed below – other problems are present in relation
to artists’ earnings that are more pronounced than in ‘ordinary’ labour markets.  The distribution
of artists’ earnings is far more skewed than is found in other occupations and therefore estimates
of mean earnings lack conviction.[6]  The associated greater variance of artists’ earnings points to
a far greater risk for artists but whether that suggests that artists are risk-averse and have to put up
with greater risk, or are in fact risk-takers is open to debate; however, that is also a question of the
validity of the assumptions rather than the accuracy of predictions.  Artists’ labour markets are
dominated by self-employment, with frequent job search and other information problems.  Artistic
output almost by definition is heterogeneous and demand for it is radically uncertain; Caves
(2000) has shown that these circumstances lead to contracting problems in the creative industries.
Persistent excess supply of artists is widely inferred from the prevalence of unemployment among
them (Towse 2001a). Moreover, there has been little empirical research on the demand for artists,
though such studies have increasingly been done for other occupations (Acemoglu 2002)[7].
These observations suggest that artists’ labour markets may be fundamentally different from other
labour markets and that the human capital model is therefore less likely to apply to them.
4.         Superstars, talent and creativity
            In this section we discuss specific features of artists’ labour markets that reinforce the
view that they differ fundamentally from other labour markets. Chief among these features is the
absence of a clear specification of talent and creativity and their role in artists’ labour markets.
            Sherwin Rosen in his seminal article ‘The Economics of Superstars’ (1981) focussed on
talent as the cause of the skewed distribution of earnings in certain professions and the vastly
higher earnings of the few superstars in them.[8] His explanation revolves around two causes: on
the supply side the development of media technologies, for example sound recording, which have
considerably increased economies of scale, enabling artists to serve a far greater market; and on
the demand side, consumer preferences for greater rather than for lesser talent when there is
imperfect substitutability between suppliers such as artists and entertainers. Superstars, according
to Rosen’s definition, are people who ‘earn enormous amounts of money and dominate the
activities in which they engage’; they are highly talented and highly rewarded for their talents
because, as Rosen shows, the net revenue earned from talent is a convex function, causing small
differences in talent to be magnified into larger differences in earnings (Rosen 1981, p. 845).
Rosen does not attempt to analyse talent other than by giving some examples – gifted surgeons,
sportspeople, singers – but he does state that talent can be ranked; indeed, he specifically avoids
the problem of measuring talent by saying ‘a cardinal measure of quality or talent must rely on
measurement of actual outcomes’ (Rosen 1981, p. 848).[9]  Very Chicago!
            We might try to analyse talent and creativity in the arts by analogy with the role of innate
ability in human capital theory. In relation to education, innate ability reduces the cost of
investment in schooling needed to achieve a given outcome, such as a university degree, as it is an
argument in the educational production function; the greater the innate ability, the higher the
productivity achieved by a given level of investment, or mutatis mutandis less investment is
needed to achieve a given level of attainment. Innate ability therefore has similar effects to the
fertility of land on cultivation. The analogy with the Ricardian theory of rent is a strong one. In
that theory differential rents are explained in terms of differential natural fertility of land and the
demand for corn; as the demand for corn shifts out (say, due to population growth), land of ever
less fertility is brought into cultivation with lower yields of corn. But which is cause and which is
effect in determining rents?
            Talent can be thought of as akin to the fertility of land, assumed to be a free gift of Nature;
it is an inborn asset, which often manifests itself early in life and it enables the ‘owner’ not only to
acquire skills more easily but also to achieve a high level of ‘artistic productivity’ – great
performances – that few competitors can supply. In the human capital model, rents to innate
ability accrue on the supply side. By contrast, Rosen’s model puts the explanation on the demand
side in which the perception of small differences in talent between individual artists causes
multiplicative effects to incomes.  One might paraphrase the Ricardian argument as follows: ‘is
the price of opera high because singers’ fees are high, or are singers’ fees high because the price
of opera is high?’  
            But there still remains the problem noted earlier of the inalienability of human capital.
When the output is a personal service such as a surgical operation or a live performance, it can
only be supplied in conjunction with labour.  The performer must be present to supply her talent
live to the audience and therefore limitations on the supply of her time lead to rewards like rent
being determined by demand.  Towse (1992) argued that this is the case for the fees of singers.
The story changes, however, when the constraints of the performer’s time are lifted by making her
services available in a reproducible form like a sound recording; this is what Rosen analysed in
his model.  Recording technology has enabled performers and other artists to reach vastly greater
markets, exacerbating the effect of small differences in talent and reducing the possibility of
substitution between artists of lesser or greater talent.
            It is time to consider what is meant by talent and creativity: ‘You’ve either got it or you
haven’t’ is something frequently said in conservatories of music and colleges of art.  As with the
inalienability problem in human capital theory, talent does not have a price because there is no
direct market for it – you cannot buy yourself some genius to get through university or become a
singer (except, perhaps, with a Faustian contract!).[10]
            Talent and creativity are widely viewed as the sine qua non of art, so what has cultural
economics to say about it? A quick answer is that it has been little discussed.  Throsby (2001) has
a short chapter on creativity, which he links to his concept of cultural value and to a utility model
of artistic supply; Frey (2000) discusses the motivation and incentives to create and the role of
public support for artists; Casta?er and Campos (2001) deal with innovation by arts organisations,
adopting a Schumpeterian approach; Caves (2000) deals with what could be called the industrial
organisation of creativity, without however explicitly discussing the concept; Towse (2001a)
analyses the reward of creativity, again with only a token discussion of creativity, and like
Throsby, associates it with artistic supply. All these authors skate around the central issue, which
is the contribution of creativity and talent to artists’ productivity and earnings.
            Creativity is often regarded as an individual activity, though there are many joint creative
activities such as theatrical rehearsals and teams of scriptwriters for soap operas.[11]  When we
speak of creative artists such as composers, authors or painters, they are essentially envisaged as
working alone, experimenting with ideas.  Another feature of creativity is originality, a spark of
novelty that comes to the artist ‘out of nowhere’ or from reworking existing ideas in new ways.
Creativity in these terms clearly parallels innovation and invention in science and technology.
Following Schumpeter (1942), the reception of creativity must also be considered (Wijnberg
1995). Is it recognised?  Can it be marketed?  Can it be motivated by financial reward?  These are
questions that are relevant to the exploitation of talent and creativity by arts organisations and the
cultural industries, as well as to cultural policies aimed at fostering the production of art. The
economic value of creativity and talent is that they are necessary inputs to satisfy consumer
demand for novelty and new experiences and to create lasting works of art.
            Enough has been said to indicate that artistic creativity and talent are perceived differently
in cultural economics than in human capital theory.  Bearing this in mind, we now turn to the
question of artistic training and consider the role of investment in human capital as a preparation
for artistic occupations.
5.         Artists’ training and occupational choice
5.1.      Expected income
            According to human capital theory, occupational choice is made on the basis of expected
lifetime income.  As ability bias reduces the cost of acquiring skills and qualifications, students
sort themselves into occupations in which they have a comparative advantage.  Taken over a
whole society, individual rational behaviour is thought to lead to an optimal allocation of human
capital.  Equilibrium is achieved in the usual way: excess supply in one occupation reduces
earnings and thus the private rate of return, causing workers – at least to some extent – to switch
jobs to other occupations. Skill shortages encourage on-the-job training; jobs/professions
requiring a greater investment in higher education and professional training offer higher lifetime
earnings to compensate for higher costs of study.  Experience adds to human capital over the
workers’ career and is rewarded by higher earnings.
            The question is: could this theory apply to artists’ labour markets or are they really
different from other labour markets?  Artists may not be rational wealth maximisers, something
that is widely believed and frequently stated by artists themselves (Abbing 2002), but that is a
behavioural assumption that cannot be tested directly. The key question is whether the choice of
an arts occupation is based on the private rate of return to investment in human capital that is
determined by the costs of schooling and artists’ earnings. As reported earlier, Throsby (1992)
found some limited support for human capital theory in the arts, so it is worthwhile taking it at
face value and seeing what resonance the theory has for artistic training and occupational choice.
            Surveys have shown that median earnings in the arts are always lower than those of other
equally qualified workers, even though the artist population has a higher than average level of
educational attainment.  The lower expected lifetime earnings in the arts, combined with the
higher indirect costs, ensure that discounted costs exceed discounted benefits in arts occupations
(Towse, 1996).  What may modify these results in the arts is the longer working life of some
artists; cross-section studies assume a normal age of retirement and that is misleading because
retirement may be very late in some artistic professions.  Some artists continue to work until they
die, and with royalties from copyrights they can continue earning even beyond the grave.  Even in
the performing arts, where there is a premium on strength and (sometimes) youth, many
performers teach and adjudicate long after they retire from performing. On the other hand, the
direct cost of training (schooling[12]) performing artists in specialised institutions is higher than
the average cost of higher education in general (Towse, 1993). However, as noted earlier, in many
European countries higher education is provided free or at very low fees and even in the USA
some students obtain scholarships that cover the cost of training; public finance therefore reduces
the direct costs of training and, other things being equal, should increase the private rate of return
to training.[13] But even if, following Mincer, we ignore the direct costs of training, the fact that
courses in performing arts are longer than those for most other subjects raises the indirect cost of
study and would therefore reduce the private rate of return.
            Despite the unfavourable prospect of financial reward in arts occupations, higher
education courses for artists are typically over-subscribed and that contributes to the over-supply
of artists.  The question of how many places should be offered in specialist colleges has been a
hotly debated one for many years: should the number be restricted so as to ensure that only the
most highly talented students receive artistic training, or should more be admitted in the hope that
good quality training will enable them to reach a satisfactory standard of competence?  It is
widely accepted that all students who complete formal training in the creative and performing arts
will not be able to make a living from their art. However, when it comes to the public finance of
higher education, considerations of equity often override those of efficiency.  Moreover it is not
easy to define what efficiency would mean in the circumstances of artists’ labour markets, given
the uncertainty surrounding the chances of success.
5.2       The role of training
            The question still remains whether it is possible to increase an artist’s human capital by
investment in formal schooling and whether training can add value in the case of less talented
students. ‘You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear’ is a saying that resonates through
specialist art, music and drama colleges.  Even if they have strict entrance requirements, colleges
cannot assess the quality of entrants with any certainty – heterogeneity and the absence of
objective information about quality pervades all aspects of artists’ labour markets.  It is also
difficult to assess colleges’ success in preparing students for work in the arts; the demand for
artists’ services in the labour market is uncertain and difficult to define since there are
few ‘regular jobs’, with most artists working in self employment on short term contracts (Gurgard
and Menger 1996). These problems raise a number of points about artists’ training that can be
analysed separately (though they may well interact in practice): the content of training;
certification in artists’ labour markets; and students’ expectations about lifetime earnings, the
nature of work opportunities and the duration of employment and career possibilities.
5.2.1. The content of training
            Given the importance of talent and creativity in the arts, one might be tempted to conclude
that the content of higher education courses in art and music colleges adds nothing to students’
innate ability, the more so if only the most gifted students are able to gain entrance.  In dance and
music most students have already had years of specialist teaching, and in other art forms students
are expected to show a portfolio or other such evidence of attainment as an entrance requirement.
What therefore can colleges offer such students?  Here it is useful to draw a distinction between
the ‘art’ element and the ‘craft’ element of artistic training.  Even very talented students need to
learn how to present their work, study repertoire or the craft of drawing and writing, and so on.
Colleges also provide facilities that are difficult or expensive for individuals to provide for
themselves, such as studios, artists’ models, participation in theatrical productions, orchestras and
suchlike.  Colleges also provide students with a forum for displaying their talents to the outside
world in exhibitions, performances, etc., and enable them to develop networks, learn professional
conduct and assess their own abilities.  This last point is particularly important because
information about one’s own quality is needed in order to make career choices – whether to
choose another occupation, whether to aim high or low, etc.  MacDonald (1988) explains drop-out
rates after the first few years of work in artistic occupations as the outcome of this search for
information. Colleges may perform a preliminary sorting function by providing that information
before entrance into the labour market takes place.
            As a coda to this brief discussion of a complex subject, it is worth pointing out that
surveys of artists’ labour markets have revealed that a significant proportion of working artists did
not receive specialist arts training.[14] There are two possible explanations: that they made the
decision to be artists after having done another higher education course; and/or that they regarded
the content of arts training courses as irrelevant, something that is frequently reported in surveys
of working artists. Either way, the finding is hostile to the human capital model, as well as to the
sorting model, as these artists were able to make their way without either formal training or a
certificate and apparently with no earnings penalty (Towse 2001a).
5.2.2.   Certification in artists’ labour markets
            Although colleges training artists award degrees and diplomas, studies of artists’ labour
markets have found that certification apparently plays a less important role in the arts than in it
does other labour markets. Certification is of course highly correlated with formal schooling,
which tests students for their achievement in following the curriculum. However, that may not
provide the kind of information wanted by employers or others hiring artistic labour for several
reasons. Artists typically are self-employed and so need not signal to an employer. A reputation
for professionalism and high quality talent/creativity are very important in artists’ labour markets
and certification by art colleges apparently does not provide adequate information about these
characteristics.  Employers may not trust colleges’ certification because they produce too many
graduates, not all of whom are sufficiently talented. Colleges have their own objective functions
and they maximise their income from student numbers, and they may also be pressed by funding
authorities to offer a mix of services to a mix of students;  these factors combine to give higher
education institutions training artists the incentive to ‘oversupply’ graduates. Indeed as stated
earlier, many ‘employers’ who hire artists show no interest in their paper qualifications and set up
expensive screening arrangements of potential employees for themselves (Towse 1993, 1996).
5.2.3. Students’ expectations
            Students face problems in forming expectations about the probability of making an artistic
career pay because there is little objective information available. Their subjective assessment of
their own talent and creativity is likely to be overestimated due to ‘the overwheening conceit of
the young’, as Adam Smith put it in the Wealth of Nations, and objective information about future
earnings and the ease of obtaining work is difficult to obtain in a labour market in which there is a
wide dispersion of earnings and frequent job change. Following criticism that young people are let
out into the real world without adequate preparation, colleges have made considerable efforts to
offer courses on business methods and how to manage a career in the arts but often to little avail;
students apparently fail to attend such courses, though they later complain that they ‘should have
been warned’ about the difficulty of making and managing a career (Towse 2001a).  These
problems might seem to support the view that young artists are irrational.  However, when
‘nobody knows’ about quality and demand for artistic output (Caves 2000), irrationality may be
confused with radical uncertainty. Rationality is inevitably bounded in artists’ labour markets.
            Students also form expectations about non-pecuniary rewards such as the opinion of peers,
the desire to work on one’s own account and other ‘psychic rewards’. These are particularly
important to artists: and they accept earnings lower than those available in alternative occupations
as a price worth paying for the chance to work in the arts and, as long as they can earn enough to
live on from other work (arts-related or non-arts jobs), they do not change occupations.  Throsby’s
evidence shows that once a ‘satisficing’ level of income has been reached from earnings from all
sources, artists devote more time to arts work, eschewing the opportunity to earn more from doing
more hours of non-arts work (Throsby 1992). Abbing (2002) has reinforced this view with ample
anecdotal evidence from the visual arts world.[15] Artists often report choosing work that offers
new challenges rather than repeating a former piece of work even if that would raise their earnings
(Jeffri and Throsby 1994).  This behaviour could be superficially interpreted as opting for utility
rather than money but it may also be efficient in improving the artist’s reputation, which is the
best investment in her future, particularly for self-employed workers (Benhamou 2000). It is
difficult to know when artists absorb these values – whether they do so as students or after they
have entered the labour market. There have been few longitudinal studies of artists’ careers by
cultural economists that match students’ expectations to their labour market experience.[16]
5.3       Does the human capital model explain artists’ training decisions?
            Finally, we come to the question of how well the human capital model performs in
explaining artists’ decisions on training and career development.  If we were to take the extreme
view that talent alone determines an artist’s career and earnings, investment in schooling would
not be worthwhile; by definition it could not raise productivity. However, casual evidence from
the biographies of artists goes contrary to that view, as many highly talented artists have trained at
art, drama or music college. Of course that could be for institutional reasons and we may question
whether an alternative organisation of training such as private lessons could have yielded the same
results. Apprenticeships in the performing and visual arts – the only source of training before the
nineteenth century – are alternatives that are still sometimes available today, for example for
potters and for opera singers.[17]
            However, as noted above, part of the experience of attending college is socialisation and
professionalisation. Blaug (1985) has pointed out that the three Ss –  skilling, screening and
socialisation – are as important in the labour market as the three Rs. All artists need to learn the
ropes; networking – forming working partnerships, meeting with other artists and with agents who
may in future be in a position to offer work, getting recommendations from well-known teachers –
may be more important than the schooling function. Tacit knowledge, trust and reputation, are
also important in artists’ labour markets. These are all features of social capital; are they also part
of human capital formation?  An important question is whether they are amenable to investment
decisions. Tacit knowledge acquired in childhood for example cannot be regarded as an
investment as it is not deliberately fostered, though early childhood education within the family
may be, and often is in the case of children’s dance and music lessons (Seaman 2003).
Acquisition of tacit knowledge and early training certainly seem to play some role in occupational
choice in the arts; there are many instances of children following in a parent’s footsteps (and not
only in the days when there was only on-the-job training). Early acquisition of knowledge is
probably easily confused with innate talent in the arts. However, there have been no systematic
studies of the influence of family background on occupational choice in the arts and it is all too
easy to generalise from the Placido Domingos and Vanessa Redgraves of this world. This topic
would be a very interesting research project and could shed light on the role played by social as
compared to human capital investment; I return to this matter below.
            These qualitative arguments may explain the weak effect cultural economists have found
for the influence of human capital on artists’ earnings. Schooling helps the artist get her first work
assignment and that may be a critical step on the career ladder. Schooling also provides general
training that can be used outside the arts and it teaches good networking and other ‘social capital’
skills. But if investment in human capital only marginally explains the observed high demand for
arts training, does that suggest that sorting models perform better? It seems from the earlier
discussion that certification also plays an ambiguous role in artists’ labour markets. Besides
formal schooling, there are other screening devices available such as prizes and competitions,
awards from Arts Councils and other forms of informal certification that offer information.[18]
However, employers do take note of the fact that artists have attended college because the college
screened them on entrance; they also treat attendance as a signal that arts students will have
acquired some basic professional skills, even if these are marginal to the innate talent necessary
for undertaking work in the arts. It seems that in a situation with over-supply of new entrants and
the presence of a sea of amateurs, the position of the potential ‘employer’ in the arts (as compared
to other labour markets) is especially difficult because of information problems; on the other hand,
making the right choice matters less in a situation in which frequent job change and working on
short term contracts is normal. And, as reported earlier, having a higher education qualification
pays off in arts related and non-arts work even if not for artistic work and that is an important
consideration for the majority of artists who inevitably hold multiple jobs. Thus, there is some
supporting evidence for the sorting model.
            In short, the jury is still out on what is an appropriate model to explain artists’ training and
occupational decisions.
6.         Human capital, social capital, cultural capital and their implications for
training artists
            We now return to the fundamental question of what purpose is served by the use of the
term ‘capital’ in human capital theory. Originally raised by Blaug (1976), who asked whether
human capital is in fact a useful metaphor, this question is being asked again in relation to social
capital and it is also relevant to the notion of cultural capital that has appeared in the literature of
cultural economics. Social capital is a concept that originated in social theory. It has provided an
umbrella term under which a range of diverse topics has been investigated by economists. Bowles
and Gintis (2002, p. F419) define it as follows: “Social capital generally refers to trust, concern
for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one’s community and to punish those
who do not”. However, Putnam (2000, p. 19) defines it as “…connections among individuals –
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them…”.  Both
aspects have been related to labour markets in general and specifically to human capital.  In a
recent review article, Sobel (2002) states: “economists find the social capital metaphor useful in
studies of economic development, transition economies, common-resource property use, and
education” (p.143, my italics). The concept of cultural capital was introduced by Throsby, who
defines it as “an asset that embodies, stores or provides cultural value in addition to whatever
economic value it may possess”, where cultural value is defined as a combination of aesthetic,
spiritual, social, historical, symbolic and authenticity values, typically produced by artists
(Throsby 2002, p. 46).[19] Thus we have three somewhat related concepts carrying the label
‘capital’. What do these concepts contribute to an understanding of artists’ labour markets and
indeed how appropriate is the capital metaphor in all these cases?
            Since the World Bank’s adoption of the concept of social capital, a number of objections
have been levelled against it by economists, notably by Kenneth Arrow (2000) and Robert Solow
(2000), who judge it according to the standard notion of capital in economics due to Irving Fisher.
Arrow’s definition of (physical) capital identifies three features: capital is deferred consumption;
it can be deliberately accumulated by investment; and it is alienable.  Solow added two further
criteria: capital has a rate of return that can be used as a measure of its value; and capital
depreciates, whether from use or from technological obsolescence.  Both Arrow and Solow
conclude that social capital does not have these characteristics. As Solow has said “social capital
is an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy” (quoted in Sobel 2002).  Many other
economists have criticised the concept from various points of view (Fine 2001; Durlauf 2002).
            Be that as it may, it seems that several features bundled together as social capital are
relevant to artists’ labour markets. How do these features help us understand artists’ incentives to
invest in acquiring skills and competences? If, as is the strong implication, social capital is a
‘public good’ (in the technical sense of that term, that is, non-rivalrous and non-excludable), the
inference is that individuals would not have the incentive to invest in themselves and therefore
artists’ training would have to be collectively financed. However, if artists can appropriate the
benefits for themselves, as they can with the human capital model, then they would have the
incentive to invest in their own training. Though much of the research on social capital has been
on its communal benefits, Glaeser et al. (2002) make the case that standard microeconomic
analysis can indeed be applied to social capital formation. Their model of individual investment in
social capital, in which individuals choose optimal levels depending upon the opportunity cost of
their time and time preference rate, is almost identical to the human capital investment model.
Clearly they assume that social capital is not a public good, although it may have some degree of
publicness. More important for our present purposes is their assertion that: “(T)he connection
between social capital and human capital is one of the most robust empirical regularities in the
social capital literature. Better understanding of this connection should be a key goal for future
research” (Glaeser et al. 2002, p. F455).   The clear implication of this is that investment in social
capital is analogous to that in human capital – indeed, the two are ‘joint products’.  But if that is
so, there is an identification problem of distinguishing the private rate of return to one from that to
the other. That muddies the debate about the relevance of human capital theory in artists’ labour
markets. It is clearly important for policy purposes to understand their separate contributions to
lifetime earnings in view of the public/private dichotomy.
            The public/private division also arises in respect of cultural capital. Throsby defines
cultural capital as the stock of goods and services that constitute society’s cultural assets, which
have been created by artists (past and present). He distinguishes tangible from intangible cultural
capital: tangible assets may be privately or publicly owned but intangible cultural capital (which
overlaps significantly with social capital) is always a public good. Both yield a return of cultural
value that Throsby regards as a communal rather than an individual variable. However, the motive
for the artist in creating these assets, according to the human capital view (which Throsby has
tested more than any other cultural economist), is the desire for private gain, whether pecuniary or
non-pecuniary.  Thus, artists’ human capital creates cultural capital –  Adam Smith would have
liked the implied doctrine of the unintended consequences of private action, the coincidence of
private incentive with public benefit. As with social capital, there are strong externalities present
in cultural capital (if not true public goods characteristics) that call for communal rather than
individual investment.
            One way of identifying the differences between these three obviously related capital
concepts is to focus on their implications for cultural policy. A central concern of cultural policy
is how society can best invest in the supply of artistic creativity. According to human capital
theory, we should encourage artists to raise their productivity through subsidies to formal training
courses in colleges and possibly also by giving artists basic income support or price subsidies in
order to raise their earnings.  Social capital instead suggests that developing social skills, joining
professional networks, acquiring a reputation and the rest are what is needed to pursue a career;
acquiring the right experience for building a reputation for reliable professional behaviour takes
precedence over schooling. Some social skills may be acquired in specialised colleges but
investment in social capital on-the-job through work experience is likely to be more effective. The
policy implications of the social capital model are therefore that there should be subsidies to
colleges providing hands-on experience with teachers who are professionally active, agreements
with professional associations and trade unions to accept young entrants, and so on. It possibly
also implies a policy of restricting the number of training places in college so as to raise the
‘exclusiveness’ and reputation of being accepted on a course. However, apprenticeship schemes
and artist-in-residence placements would seem to be more effective in building social capital. As
noted, social capital and human capital are likely to be formed side by side and for both there is a
private return to the individual that is an incentive to investment.
            The implications of the notion of cultural capital for cultural policy are complex and reach
to the heart of artistic creativity and the difficulty of applying economic analysis when motivation
and outcomes are not easily understood in terms of economic rationality. To say that artists are
motivated by the desire to supply cultural value (as I interpret Throsby to do) is simply to ‘pass
the buck’ by changing the language. It does not tell us how that translates into economic terms
such as productivity or earnings. We may accept that cultural heritage (or accumulated cultural
capital), whether tangible or intangible, is a public good formed by artists in pursuit of their own
motives but that does not tell us how it influences successive generations of artists. It could be
argued that the greater the stock of cultural heritage, the more difficult it is for artists to be
creative, and training that makes students aware of that heritage runs the risk of frightening them
off. Conversely, making your mark may best be achieved by shock tactics rejecting that heritage.
Therefore, investment in cultural capital by preserving heritages could be either an incentive or a
disincentive to individual creativity and furthermore may similarly influence consumers’ taste or
distaste for new works. It is certainly difficult in some art forms, notably music and opera, to get
audiences to attend performances of contemporary creators. The public good nature of cultural
capital also implies that it is difficult for individual artists to appropriate the full economic value
of their work (Wijnberg, 1995). This is one of the rationales for copyright law (see below).
            The above points raise the question how artistic motivation may be stimulated by
government policy. Frey (1997) has developed a general theory of economic motivation based on
human psychology that includes the response to pecuniary incentives – extrinsic reward – but
extends the maximand to the satisfaction of an inner intrinsic motivation.  While other cultural
economists have recognised this distinction, Frey’s insight is what he calls the ‘Crowding Effect’,
the proposition that inappropriate rewards can displace incentives; for example, monetary
payment, an extrinsic reward, may crowd out intrinsic motivation and become a disincentive
rather than an incentive for acts which are intrinsically motivated.  A better response may be
achieved by offering intrinsic rewards to inner-motivated output; an optimal system combines
appropriate incentives and rewards. In applying this analysis to the arts, Frey (2000) asks how
government support for the arts affects creativity.  He distinguishes what he calls ‘institutional
creativity’ from ‘personal creativity’: institutional creativity is motivated by extrinsic rewards and
personal creativity is motivated by intrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards are what the market and
the state can offer – the market via prices for artists’ work and the state through direct financial
measures such as subsidy, and indirect measures such as copyright law (Towse 2001b).  Personal
creativity is clearly more closely related to intrinsic motivation, which in its extreme form is the
Romantic concept of the driven genius pursuing art for art’s sake at all costs. Its reward is
intrinsic, for example via recognition by one’s peers; this is not something the state can offer.  But
even personal creativity is subjected by Frey to an economic interpretation by applying the all-
powerful doctrine of opportunity cost: younger artists can ‘afford’ to be more creative than older
established artists because they have less to lose artistically and financially.
            Frey’s theory seems to get us somewhat closer to the crucial question about creativity and
cultural policy: can we ‘create’ creativity by investment, private or public?  That obviously has
important implications for the present-day policy in many countries that emphasise the role of the
creative industries. However, whether we espouse the concepts of human, social or cultural capital
as our guide to cultural policy towards artists, it is difficult to get away from the role of innate
talent. In fact, none of these theories comes to terms with this issue. Even distinguishing intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation does not solve the matter. All told, we must accept the fact that the
probability of backing the right horse and choosing only highly talented artists to nurture and
support is very low. ‘Many are called but few chosen’ has to be the motto for art colleges and
artists’ labour markets. At best, they filter out the least able and create conditions in which the
best can make their way. Throwing money at arts training by way of investing either in human,
social or cultural capital does not really solve the problem of how to create or improve creativity.
So how should we attempt to create and improve creativity? The answer is quite simply that we
do not know.
7.         Human capital theory, copyright law and reproducibility
            I now turn to an old problem in human capital theory – its inalienability - and argue that
the combination of the ability to reproduce works of art (‘reproducibility’) and copyright law
overcome previous objections to the capital analogy, namely that human capital cannot be
separated from labour. There is a close relationship between human capital and copyright since
both spring from the human mind.  Copyright law protects authors and performers by establishing
statutory property rights that enable them to control the exploitation of their works, granting them
the exclusive right to authorize their use.[20]   The economic purpose of copyright is to encourage
creativity and the dissemination inter alia of works of art.[21] 
            The evolution of copyright law is inextricably connected to the ability to make mechanical
copies that began with the invention of the printing press. The development of recording
technologies – sound recording, motion picture making, photocopiers, home recording equipment
(VCRs, CD burners) and now the internet – that duplicate a work from a master copy (a
performance, a book, a photograph) has vastly extended reproducibility. These inventions have
created markets for copyrighted works embedded in CDs, videos, computer games etc., that have
been alienated from the person of the artist or creator. Creators mostly have their work marketed
by ‘publishers’ (record, film, TV, publishing companies, art galleries and so on – firms in the
creative or cultural industries) who act on the assignment or licence of the copyright by the
creator. The typical contract is a royalty contract, which may or may not include an advance
payment, sharing the sales revenue of the publisher for a fixed percentage, often 10 or 15
percent.[22] Once economic rights have been assigned, however, the artist has little residual
control over exploitation (though moral rights may not be alienated).  When firms decide to delete
works from the catalogue, artists can rarely do anything to stop them.  Copyright enables artists to
earn from their investment human capital but it does not ensure they do so and how much they
earn depends on market forces. It was noted earlier that superstar earnings are disproportionately
higher than ‘middle income’ artists.  That is also the case with copyright royalty income. Because
superstars have greater bargaining power with firms in the cultural industries, they are able to
strike a better bargain than ‘ordinary’ artists (Caves, 2000).  ‘Average’ artists’ royalty earnings, by
contrast, are typically low (Towse, 2001a).
            One other feature of copyright that can be mentioned in this context is ‘works-for-hire’,
according to which copyright is conferred on the employer in cases where the employee was
directed to do the work; that is typically the situation for Hollywood script-writers and animators,
for example. Therefore the control of copyright assets depends on the way the labour market for
artists is organised – the less full-time employment there is, the more important copyright is for
freelancers.
            The exploitation of the author’s work embodied in reproducible form has a double-sided
effect: it ‘alienates’ the author’s human capital input from her labour as the work can now reach
the market without the necessity of her presence; and through copyright law the publisher acquires
a durable asset, the master copy, which he can exploit independently of the author (who may even
be dead since the copyright term is life plus 70 years).[23] Thus the joint effect of reproducibility
and copyright law has been the creation of capital assets in the hands of the firms in the cultural
industries that may be traded and transferred in mergers.  The AOL/Time Warner merger, for
example, involved the transfer of 1.5m song titles. This effect is believed by writers on the
cultural industries to be responsible for increased merger activity (Bettig 1996).
            Another effect of the combination of copyright law and reproducibility on artists’ labour
markets is that an artist can decide to allocate her time to earn a spot price or a future return – for
example, doing a sound recording in preference to a concert (since the concert pays a fee and the
sound recording a royalty). Copyright therefore alters the duration of human capital and artists’
supply decisions.  In addition to dividing their time between arts and non-arts work (Throsby
1996) or ‘high art’ and ‘low art’ (Cowen and Tabarrock 2000), artists can optimise a portfolio of
copyrights that form part of an inter-temporal decision about present and future earnings. Taking
this into account, an artist’s earnings at any point in time depend upon wages and fees for the
hours of work done in that period plus copyright royalty payments (the royalty rate times the
number of copyrights the artist holds). It is to be expected that the higher the royalty income, the
fewer hours of work artists would do in any given period. A model along these lines could be
tested using data from artists’ surveys that asked for separate information on fees and wages and
on royalties.[24]
            The combination of copyright law and reproducibility therefore fundamentally alters two
issues in human capital theory, the inalienability of human capital from labour and the period over
which the worker can recoup the investment in human capital. As a result of these two features,
human capital thus becomes conceptually far closer to physical capital. It is likely that these
features are also present in other labour markets, especially those in the ‘information’ industries.
Casualisation of labour, preferences for self-employment, the increased value of information and
knowledge, and the increased value of protection through copyright and other intellectual property
law are growing in the economy at large. Artists’ labour markets may indeed be the forerunner of
a more general trend in the evolution of labour markets.
            It remains to consider whether a policy of ‘strengthening’ copyright law or ‘increased
copyright protection’, both much touted by the cultural industries and their pressure groups as
assisting artists (as well as themselves). That is a complex question that has been little researched.
Strengthening copyright for artists, for example by lengthening its duration, is a two-edged sword:
while increasing protection it also takes more work out of the public domain, thus also increasing
the cost of creation (Landes and Posner, 1989). It also benefits companies in the cultural industries
more than individual artists since companies have better access to capital markets and a higher
time preference rate, though it must be admitted that this is an assertion that remains unproven
(Towse, 1999). In Towse (2001b), however, I argued that copyright may well meet Frey’s call for
intrinsic motivation for artists by providing symbolic recognition of their status. This is something
that could be investigated further.
8.         Conclusion
            In this chapter, I have argued that human capital theory applies only weakly to artists’
decisions about investment in schooling and training and about occupational choice. The same,
however, can be said about the sorting model, though the case for it is possibly somewhat
stronger. What is lacking in cultural economics is an understanding of talent and creativity, what
economic factors motivate artists and how creativity can be encouraged as part of government
cultural policy. Bringing social and cultural capital into the equation do not seem to add much in
the way of understanding artists’ labour markets. The case has been made in this chapter that
reproducibility of works of art in combination with copyright law alters the view that human
capital cannot be separated from the labour of the artist but that separation, while intellectually
interesting, does not help artists to greater rewards in and of itself; indeed, it may well be a cause
of increasing skewness of artists’ earnings. The effect of copyright earnings on artists’ supply
decisions is something that must be tested empirically and I have sketched a model that could be
used as a basis for further investigation. It could be linked to longitudinal studies of artists’
careers, another piece of research that is badly needed.
            By concentrating on the role of human capital in artists’ labour markets, the focus has been
on the supply side. So far there have been no systematic studies of the demand for artists or
attempts to analyse skill-bias in the arts.  This type of study has increasingly been done in labour
economics in order to understand changes in rates of return to human capital over the last 30 years
(Acemoglu 2002). Cultural economists who have studied artists’ labour markets are certainly
aware of the increasing demands that are made on artists’ skills and competencies and also of the
ever growing skills of certain kinds of artists – for example, singers and instrumentalists now
routinely perform music that was considered unplayable 75 years ago and do so with little
rehearsal. That is surely a sign of increased productivity.[25] This is another important topic for
future research in artists’ labour markets.
            It is essential that cultural economics in general and the study of artists’ labour markets in
particular continue to apply standard economic ideas to the arts and to test them.  The arts form
part of the economy; they use resources and produce consumer goods.  Artists are workers – they
may be more like ministers of religion, inventors or creative engineers than accountants or travel
agents but as a starting point it is right to look for similarities between artists and other workers
using labour economics and human capital theory.  That has been the approach of those who
initiated research on artists’ labour markets; however, experience so far suggests that the human
capital model is not the way forward.  The overall conclusion, then, is that there has been
empirical progress in the analysis of artists’ labour markets but there is much more to be done.
            In closing, it is interesting to note that there are some strong parallels between aspects of
artists’ labour markets and those of sportspeople. In both fields the role of talent, innate ability
and ability acquired early in life exert a strong influence on earnings and career success, and
superstardom is probably even more marked in sport than in the arts. Seaman (2003) concludes
that there is much to be gained by cultural economists from joint research between the two fields.
Maybe artists are after all not so completely different!
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[1] See Smith (1976) p. 124.
[2] It has, however, proved difficult to find convincing examples of specific training other than the
necessary learning period that marks the first few days or weeks of employment for any worker.
[3] See Wassall and Alper in this volume; also McNertney and Waits (1997).
[4] Withers’ estimation was done in 1984 and Throsby’s in 1992; the references cited are
reprinted in Towse (1997).  The McNertney and Waits survey was done in 1988 and is also
reprinted in Towse (1997), the earlier version now being difficult to obtain.
[5] Thirty years later Blaug’s insights have been confirmed by Weiss (1995), who states that
sorting models are a refinement and an extension of human capital theory rather than an
alternative.
[6] See Seaman (2003) for recent analysis of variances in artists’ earnings and for a comparison
with sportspeople’s earnings.
[7] Towse (1993) collected information on the demand for classically trained singers.
[8] See further in Adler in this volume.
[9] See Towse (2001a) chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this point.
[10] Whether or not it can be produced through investment in schooling is discussed in the next section on the
economics of training.
[11] Seaman (2003) contrasts research in the economics of sport on sportspeople working in
teams with the far more limited work in cultural economics on teamwork in the arts.
[12] At the risk of confusing formal training in the sense of schooling with on-the job-training, I
have switched to the common way of speaking of the lessons and other forms of teaching that are
provided in specialist colleges as artists’ ‘training’.  Not all arts training in that sense is confined
to specialist art, music or drama colleges, even for performers: writers and composers often do
academic courses in universities. There are different institutional arrangements in different
countries. The point is that students receive formal education apparently dedicated to artistic
occupations.
[13] The social rate of return in specific occupations is used to evaluate public policy decisions
about the allocation of educational funding; Towse (1996) suggests the social rate of return to
training artists is very low, even negative.
[14] 30 percent is a not untypical figure; see Towse (2001a).
[15] Abbing is writing mostly about the position of artists in the Netherlands, where a government
support scheme for visual artists was tried in the 1970s, resulting in a vast oversupply of very
large works of art. It also led to a considerable oversupply of artists with the result that art prices
are low, creating a vicious circle of dependence on state basic income payments (Abbing, 2002;
see also Rengers and Velthuis, 2002).
[16] See Wassall and Alper in this volume for a discussion of longditudinal studies.
[17] Until the mid-twentieth century in Italy, the standard training of singers consisted of the pupil
going to live with the Maestro and having daily lessons. Tito Gobbi trained that way and so did
Cecilia Bartoli, whose singer parents taught her at home. Conductors often started as
repetiteurs in opera houses teaching singers their parts or even, as in the case of Georg Solti, as
pianists working for a singing teacher. Opera houses have fairly recently reintroduced
apprenticeship schemes for trained young singers to acquire work experience.
[18] See Wijnberg (2003) for a discussion of the role of awards in the arts.
[19] For a full discussion, see Throsby (2001; Ch. 2).
[20] Copyright law in the Anglo Saxon tradition applies both to authors, performers and
‘publishers’ – companies in the cultural industries, such as producers of sound recordings and
film. In the European civil law tradition, authors’ r
q¢ÔÕÖÞàáâ











hyi†h=Z?hyi†h=Z?CJhyiights pertain to human creators and neighbouring rights to the other groups.
Here I use the term copyright loosely to refer to both types of rights.
[21] See Landes (2003) and in this volume.
[22] Watt (2000) analyses royalty contracts in detail from the economic point of view.
[23] It is often forgotten that an author’s work is protected for a longer period than the copyright
term. If, for example, an author creates a work at the age of 25 and she lives to the age of 75, that
work is protected for 120 years.
[24] For a preliminary attempt at such a model, see Towse and Watt (2005).
[25] One of the long run effects of the espousal of Baumol’s Cost Disease in the performing arts
has been the assumption that no technical progress is possible in the arts or on the part of artists.
That is, however, a misunderstanding. See Cowen (1998) for a counter view; see also Baumol,
Brooks in this volume.
